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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
THE EFFECTS OF FOREIGN AID ON 
GOVERNMENT CORRUPTION IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICAN COUNTRIES 
 
 
By 
 
Yunjeong Kwak 
 
 
 
Aid effectiveness arises as a key issue in the international development field. Sub-Saharan Africa 
Countries, in particular, received a huge amount of aid money in the past decades. However, they still 
remain in a poverty trap due to a lack of good governance. In fact, Dambisa Moyo, a Zambian economist, 
argues that foreign aid is not effective in Sub-Saharan Africa, as it intensifies government corruption. To 
examine the effect of aid on government corruption, this paper investigates empirical analysis by using a 
fixed effect approach with panel data from 40 Sub Saharan countries from 2002 to 2013. This empirical 
test also shows the effect of not only Net ODA (% of GNI) but also bilateral and multilateral aid (% GNI) 
on government corruption. The results of the empirical tests show that increasing aid creates more serious 
corruption, for Net ODA and bilateral and multilateral aid. Even though foreign aid does not improve the 
quality of governance, it does not mean that we should stop the flow of aid. Rather, clearer and more 
effective aid monitoring and evaluation are needed on the part of the donors. Recipient governments 
should also develop mature civic awareness through improved training programs or E-government, which 
are useful ways to achieve transparency in government. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Corruption is not a new phenomenon in our society. It spreads from the public sector to the private 
sector in diverse ways. Although good governance and legal institutions are well established in most 
developed countries, corruption still remains and generates many social and economic problems. In many 
developing countries, corruption is one of the serious obstacles which impede social and economic 
development. It aggravates the gap between the rich and the poor, who still suffer from the poverty trap. 
Looking at the definition of corruption as, “the misuse or abuse of public office for private gain,”1 it is 
obvious that the impact of public sector corruption on society raises more serious problems than it does in 
the private sector. Public sector corruption can directly impact policy and schemes which significantly 
impact economic growth and social development. Indeed, a lack of transparency, which is highly correlated 
to corruption, leads to political rent problems, which in turn bring about private corruption and market 
failure.  
To deal with the aforementioned situation, and corruption in general, ultimately, many studies have 
proven the determinants of corruption in recent years. There are many various factors which have had a 
significant impact on corruption. The most consistent factor is the effect of income on corruption. In the 
Threisman paper, he demonstrated that in countries where income per capital is higher, government 
corruption is much lower.2 It is also very common that political factors have a very close association with 
corruption. Montinola and Jackman argued that even in democratic countries, corruption in the public sector 
can be quite serious. They found that illiberal democratic countries are more corrupt than autocratic 
                                          
1 World Bank, 1997; UNDP, 1999 
2 Daniel Treisman, “The Causes of Corruption: A Cross-national Study.” (Journal of Public 
Economics, vol. 76, no. 3 2000), 399-457. 
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countries.3 Of course, a country which guarantees freedom of the press is less corrupt.4 Furthermore, 
government size has a significant negative impact on corruption if the level of democracy is too low.5 On 
the contrary, an increase in relative wages, which identifies the ratio of public sector wages to private sector 
wages (manufacturing or other industries), decreases corruption level.6  
Recently, foreign aid issues have arisen as one of the important factors in corruption. As Dambisa 
Moyo, a Zambian economist, said, “Money from rich countries has trapped many African nations in a cycle 
of corruption, slower economic growth and poverty. Cutting off the flow would be far more beneficial.”7 In 
spite of the increasing amount of foreign aid, the economic and social status of these African nations is still 
unfavorable due to corrupt governments and a lack of sound institutional reform. 
A few scholars, on the other hand, insist that foreign aid is effective in improving governance and 
reducing corruption. According to previous theoretical views, foreign aid improves governance by retaining 
revenue constraints, so that developing governments can implement legal systems against corruption. 
Moreover, aid could release governments from binding revenue constraints and enable them to concentrate 
on enforcing law and order or fighting corruption effectively. In addition, aid could provide developing 
countries much needed technical assistance in building effective institutions to improve governance. 
According to the Van Rijckeghem and Weder, foreign, aid can improve the quality of governance in terms of 
the capacity for building programs or increasing salaries. There are also many studies which demonstrate 
that foreign aid can lead to the implementation of good policies and legal institutions. 
                                          
3 Gabriella R. Montinola, and Robert W. Jackman, "Sources of Corruption: A Cross-Country Study." 
(British Journal of Political Science, vol. 32, no.1, 2002), p.147-70. 
4 Aymo Brunettia and Beatrice Weder, “A free press is bad news for corruption”, (Journal of Public 
Economics, vol.87, no. 7–8, 2003), p.1801–1824 
5 Go Kotera, and al. "Government Size, Democracy, and Corruption: An Empirical Investigation." 
(Economic Modelling, vol. 29, no.6, 2012) p.2340-348. 
6 Vansh Muttreja, “Effects of Wages of Government Officials on Corruption in Developing 
Countries” (Duke University Durham, 2012) 
7 Dambisa Moyo, Dead Aid: Why Aid Is Not Working and How There Is a Better Way for 
Africa,(Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2009). 71 
 3 
 
However, as Dambisa Moya said above, most research supports the assertion that the impact of 
foreign aid is that it significantly intensifies public sector corruption. Many developing countries receive 
foreign aid from developed countries for the purpose of economic and social development and poverty 
reduction. However, the general population in aid recipient countries remains in a poverty trap. According to 
Alesina and Dallar, around two-thirds of the foreign aid that flows to least developed countries, goes to 
government expenditures. Obviously foreign aid is used for government expenditure, since official foreign 
aid flows from the governments in developed countries to those in developing countries. However, two 
researchers also found that that the destination of pure money is in the pockets of public sector bureaucrats, 
rather than some form of distribution or benefit to the general public.8 
According to the Corruption Perception Index for 2014 from Transparency International, most of the 
least developed countries, as defined by the United Nations, received a score of less than 35. Indeed, among 
these least developed countries, more than 60% of these countries are Sub-Saharan Africa countries. Among 
the 48 Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries, 4 countries out of 10 scored less than 30. Indeed, most of SSA 
countries ranked in the bottom.9 
Figure1. Histogram of 2014 Corruption Perception Index Score 
                                                     Source : International Transparency 
 
                                          
8 Alberto Alesina and Dollar David, “Who gives foreign aid to whom and why?” (Journal of 
Economic Growth, vol.5 no.1 2000), p.33-63. 
9 Transparency International, “Corruption Perceptions Index 2014,” (Berlin, 2014) 
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On the contrary, according to World Bank data, SSA Countries is the highest share of net ODA to GNI 
region among the developing regions in a decade. This issue is related to aid effectiveness, which has been a 
key and controversial issue in the development cooperation field in recent decades. 
 
Figure2. Net ODA Received (% of GNI) from 2000 to 2013
Source : World Bank Data 
 
Thus, the question of the impact of foreign aid on the quality of governance, more specifically 
corruption, is potentially of great importance for economic and social development and for the elimination of 
the poverty trap, in general. Why are Sub-Saharan countries still suffering from corruption even though they 
receive more aid than other developing regions? Does aid really cause corruption? If yes, which types of 
foreign aid directly affect public sector corruption, bilateral foreign aid, or multilateral aid? The purpose of 
this paper is to examine the significant effects of aid on government corruption. Furthermore, we will 
investigate whether bilateral aid or multilateral aid has any impact on government corruption.  
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2. Literature Review 
 
 
There is no doubt about the importance of the nexus of foreign aid and corruption. However, there 
are few studies which tackle this subject. Most of the previous empirical and theoretical literature about the 
effects of aid has covered not only corruption, but also good governance or economic growth. Therefore, this 
review of literature will cover the impact of aid on good governance.  
 
2.1. Aid is effective for good governance 
Even though, there are some skeptical points of view, the effectiveness of aid on good governance is 
still theoretically respected in the international development field for several reasons.  
According to Van Rijckeghem and Weder, foreign aid can improve the quality of governance by 
providing capacity building programs or increasing salaries.10 Indeed, through improved training programs, 
such as public sector capacity building, bureaucrats can become aware of how corruption ruins economic 
development which will cause them to become concerned about government transparency. In addition, when 
salaries increase, governments can hire more capable bureaucrats, which means that bribe-offering can be 
reduced.  
In addition, recently, many studies have proven that foreign aid is effective for good governance or 
may reduce corruption, depending on its type. Actually, there are diverse types of foreign aid: multilateral 
aid and bilateral aid by agent, and different foreign aid projects such as technical assistance. Although total 
ODA has negative effects on good governance, some studies reveal that multilateral and bilateral aid can 
improve the quality of government in recipient countries.  
                                          
10 Caroline Van Rijckeghem and Beatrice Weder, “Bureaucratic corruption and the rate of 
temptation: do wages in the civil service affect corruption, and by how much?”, (Journal of Development 
Economics, vol.65, no.2, 2001), p. 307-331 
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As a noteworthy finding, Knack showed that foreign aid can improve government quality and 
reduce corruption depending on different types of foreign aid.11 In his research, he demonstrated that 
various types of aid can improve the quality of institutions, with the exception of technical assistance. This 
type of aid causes the level of democracy in developing countries to dwindle.  
Another researcher, Okada Samreth, has also shown that foreign aid has a positive effect on 
reducing government corruption.12 This research proved that bilateral and multilateral aid can reduce 
government corruption with quantile regression methodology. To be specific, multilateral aid, such as the 
World Bank and IMF, has a greater effect in reducing government corruption than does bilateral aid. This is 
because, when international organizations provide foreign aid to recipient countries, they usually attach 
conditionality, such as improving governance or democracy level, reforming institutions and so on. However, 
it does not mean that bilateral aid is not effective in reducing government corruption. The test results showed 
that there are different impacts of aid on government corruption, depending on the donors. Their empirical 
results showed that foreign aid from Japan has a positive effect in the reduction of corruption in recipient 
countries, while aid from other DAC countries, the UK and France, does not.  
Mohamed and al.’s empirical test with quantile regression also illustrated that total ODA can reduce 
corruption in Sub-Saharan African countries.13 However, one interesting feature indicated is that the greater 
the corruption level of the country, the greater the effect of foreign aid in reducing corruption, whereas 
Tavares had a totally reverse result, with a greater effect showing for less corrupted countries.   
Furthermore, Mohamed and al. proved that both multilateral aid and bilateral aid do not have 
significant effects on government corruption in Sub-Saharan African countries. Ear, Dunning, and Tavares 
                                          
11 Stephen Knack, “Aid dependence and the quality of governance: cross-country empirical 
tests”,(Southern Economic Journal, vol. 68 no. 2, 2001), p. 310-329 
12 Okada and Samreth, “The effect of foreign aid on corruption: A quantile regression approach”, 
(Economics Letters, vol. 115, 2012), p.240-243 
13 Masoud R. Mohamed and al. "Effect of Foreign Aid on Corruption: Evidence from Sub-Saharan 
African Countries." (International Journal of Social Economics vol. 42, no. 1, 2015), p. 47-63 
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also identified that multilateral aid improves the quality of government or institutions due to conditionality.14 
He argues that governments in recipient countries should guarantee institutional reform or improvements in 
order to receive funds from Mutual banks such as the IMF or the African Development Bank. Lastly, the 
Goldsmith’s paper indicates that an increase in aid flow leads to a political democracy and a liberal economy 
in African countries.15  
 
2.2. Aid is not effective on good governance 
Most researchers have a skeptical point of view regarding the effect of foreign aid on governance, 
echoing Dambisa Moyo’s argument. This position has been quietly demonstrated since 1990. Many great 
scholars, such as Collier, Dollar, Kapar and Webb, have shown that even when aid is conditional, which 
means having conditions such as institutional reform or the implementation of political or economic schemes 
in recipient countries, it is not effective in terms of good governance and good policy. Mauro also reveals 
that excessive foreign aid increases corruption levels, which is directly related to low economic growth in his 
paper.16  
According to Jakob Svensson, foreign aid leads to a fuel rent-seeking problem. One interesting 
feature in his paper, published in 2000, is to examine the negative effect of foreign aid on rent-seeking by 
using a game-theoretic rent-seeking model. He used a panel dataset of 66 recipient countries on an average 
of every five years from 1980 to 1995. Similar to other previous literature, corruption from ICRG was a 
dependent variable and total grant (not ODA) was the key explanatory variable. Infant mortality, democracy 
and trade as share of GDP were other control variables. Through his empirical results, grant types of aid 
accelerates rent-seeking because it works as an inducement for reform. What he found is that when excessive 
                                          
14 Sophal Ear, “Does Aid Dependence Worsen Governance?”, (International Public Management 
Journal, vol. 10, No.3, 2007), p.259 
15 A. Goldsmith, “foreign aid and statehood in Africa”, (International Organization, vol.55, no.1, 
2001), p.123-128 
16 Paolo Mauro, “Corruption and Growth”, (The Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol.110, no. 3, 
1995), p.681-712  
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amounts of aid inflow, governments reduce public provisions. Therefore, the level of rent-seeking increases 
and the impact of rent-seeking becomes directly a matter of corruption.  
Another relative study of aid and governance in recipient countries is the aforementioned Knack’s 
paper in 2001. Although he found that foreign aid can improve the quality of governance, his final analysis 
was that immoderate aid flow deteriorates governance in recipient countries.17 As in the Busse and Gröning 
paper, he used ICRG data as governance quality, but with a cross-country analysis of 80 countries. As a 
control variable, he used ODA (% of GDP), income per capita, religious or legal tradition and colonial 
heritage. In his 2004 paper, he also investigated the effects of aid on democracy by using a multivariate 
analysis approach. He used a panel dataset with a large sample of recipient countries from the period of 1975 
to 2000, using a democracy index from Freedom House, and net ODA as a percentage of GNI and 
government spending. In his paper, the multivariate results showed that foreign aid does not have significant 
effects on democracy level. Thus, he concluded that aid is not effective to increase in level of democracy.18 
Although this study focused only on democracy, there is no doubt that the level of democracy is highly 
associated with the quality of governance. A higher level of democracy means that all citizens can actively 
participate in politics and civic life, and from this citizens will require transparency from their government, 
in their role of supervisor. Therefore, despite different dependent variables, the results of this paper can 
represent one of the negative points of view for the effect of foreign aid on good governance.  
In recent studies, Busse and Gröning proved that foreign aid has a negative effect on the quality of 
government by using an instrument variable on panel data of 106 recipient countries.19 In their empirical 
model, quality of governance identified an International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) indicator which 
consists of three parts: as a corruption level; law and order; and quality of bureaucracy data. These three 
                                          
17 Stephen Knack, “Aid Dependence and the Quality of Governance: Cross-Country Empirical 
Tests”, (Southern Economic Journal, vol.68, no.2, 2001), p.329 
18 Stephen Knack, “Does Foreign Aid Promote Democracy?”, (International Studies Quarterly, 
vol.48, no.2, 2004), p. 251-266 
19 Matthias Busse and Steffen Gröning, “Does foreign aid improve governance?”, (Economics 
Letters, vol. 104, no.2, 2009) p. 78 
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variables have the same ascending order, so a higher value is less corrupt, has more law and order, and has a 
good quality of bureaucracy. The test results showed that aid was significantly (less than 1% significance 
level) negative on the quality of governance. In other words, foreign aid cannot improve the quality of 
governance.  
There are two more recent studies which reveal negative arguments of aid effectiveness on 
governance. One uses a purely cross-sectional analysis with panel data from 32 African countries from 1982 
to 1997. The paper reveals how aid decreases the quality of governance and increases corruption in the 
following way. When recipient countries receive foreign aid, this official money expands government 
revenue without any effort.20 In other words, aid might cut back the role of the government, which is 
responsible for maintaining the rule of law, social security, and so on. In this way it makes place for 
corruption.  
Another research paper points out that donor fragmentation leads to a low quality of bureaucracy in 
African countries. In this paper, authors used a purely cross-sectional analysis from 1982 to 2001 of 32 
African countries. Their result showed that when there are many donors in one aid project or in a recipient 
country to “help” social and economic development, the quality of bureaucracy deceases. In other words, it 
creates space of corruption.21  
As aforesaid, many studies from great scholars have already demonstrated the impact of foreign aid 
on governance. However, there are three missing points. First, the meaning of governance is obviously broad, 
and previous literature generated mixed results. Of course, some studies directly prove the relationship 
between aid and corruption. However, most of the data is outdated and sample countries for empirical tests 
were not specified. Each country has a different social and cultural situation. Therefore, at least, samples 
should be narrowed down by region, such as Sub-Saharan African countries, or East Asian countries and so 
                                          
20 Brautigam, Deborah A., and Stephen Knack, “Foreign Aid, Institutions, and Governance in Sub-
Saharan Africa”,( Economic Development and Cultural Change, vol.52, no.2, 2004), p.265 
21 Stephen Knack and Aminur Rahman, “Donor Fragmentation and Bureaucratic Quality in Aid 
Recipients”, (Journal of Development Economics, vol.83, no. 1, 2007), p.176-197 
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on. Lastly, although there are a few studies regarding aid and corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa, the 
methodology is limited to only quantile regression (e.g. Okada and Samreth and Mohamed and al.). The key 
issue when using quantile regression is heterogeneity problems of unobservable variables.  
To deal with those limitations, an empirical test of this paper will concretely compose: First, the 
main model will be the directly proven impact of foreign aid on government corruption; Second, the sample 
is limited to developing countries of Sub-Saharan African where foreign aid is the most ineffective by using 
panel data from 2002 to 2013; Third, a fixed effect approach will be used which can control for some 
unobserved covariates. Thus, this paper can contribute towards checking the effectiveness of recent aid flows 
on government corruption in Sub-Saharan African countries. 
 
 
3. Data and Methodology  
 
 
In the previous chapter, we reviewed past studies and shared their limitations. As aforementioned, 
the last paragraph of chapter 2, and chapter 3 more specifically provides data description, an introduction of 
the main empirical test model, and methodology to deal with the limitations of previous studies. 
 
3.1. Empirical test Model and Data description  
It is quite clear that we are investigating the impact of aid on government corruption in Sub-Saharan 
African countries. In this paper, the data of all the control variables and dependent variables cover the panel 
data of 40 Sub-Saharan African countries from 2002 to 2013. The countries and time period were chosen 
based on data availability.   
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Table 1. Forty Sub-Saharan African Countries 
Angola Equatorial Guinea Madagascar Senegal 
Benin Eritrea Malawi Seychelles 
Botswana Ethiopia Mali Sierra Leone 
Burkina Faso Gabon Mauritania South Africa 
Burundi The Gambia Mauritius Sudan 
Cameroon Ghana Mozambique Tanzania 
Central African Republic Guinea Namibia Togo 
Chad Kenya Niger Uganda 
Congo (Brazzaville) Lesotho Nigeria Zambia 
Congo (Democratic Republic) Liberia Rwanda Zimbabwe 
 
Thus, the key variables should be corruption and foreign aid. In addition to those two important 
variables, there are also several key determinants of corruption which will be included our empirical model; 
government size, GDP per capita, democracy level, and rule of law. Many scholars, including Alsesina and 
Angeletos, argue that government size significantly affects its corruption level.22 A large government size 
encourages political rent-seeking or illegal activities such as bribery, which is highly associated with 
corruption. GDP per capita, which is the standard measurement of the level of economic and social 
development, can also be one of the biggest causes of corruption, especially in developing countries.23 Level 
of democracy is definitely one of the key determinants of corruption.24 In general, countries where 
corruption level is low have a higher quality of democracy because democracy is related to political liberty 
and both make government more transparent and accountable. Furthermore, in countries with a high level of 
democracy, citizens monitor the government’s behavior by political participation and competition. Lastly, 
rule of Law is a significant cause of corruption.  A lot of research reveals that rule of Law improves the 
quality of institutions which have power against corruption.   
Considering the variables above, the main empirical model is specified as follows:  
                                          
22 Go Kotera and al., 2012; Billger and Goel, 2009 Goel and nelson, 1998; Rose-Ackerman, 1978.  
23 Fréchette, 2006; Braun and Di tella, 2004. 
24 Chang and Golden, 2007; Lederman et al.,2005; Kunicova and Rose-Ackerman, 2005.  
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Corruptionit= β଴ ൅ Net ODA ሺ% 𝑜𝑓 𝐺𝑁𝐼ሻitβଵ ൅ 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥it 𝛽ଶ                            
൅ 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒it βଷ ൅ 𝑅𝑢𝑙𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐿𝑎𝑤it βସ                     … ሺ1ሻ
൅  𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝it βହ ൅  u௜௧ 
 
Where i and t stand for each SSA countries and time (from 2002 to 2013),  β଴ is intercept, and uit is 
error term. Corruptionit is corruption index of country i in year t. Net ODA is percentage of ODA as a share 
of GNI. The Democracy Index is constructed by taking the average of political rights and civil liberties 
provided by Freedom House. Government size is generally defined as government final consumption, a ratio 
of GDP or the ratio of population in the public sector to total population. In this paper, generate government 
expenditure as a ratio of GDP will be used. Rule of Law is one of the Worldwide Governance indicators 
from the World Bank. It reflects the level of perceptions which cause people to trust and comply with the 
rules of society. In particular it deals with property rights, jurisdiction and policing, as well as the probability 
of crime and violence. Lastly, Log GDP per cap is taken from the logarithm of GDP per capita in 2005 
constant dollars.25 
To examine the more specific impact of aid, we will analyze foreign aid by separating the character 
of agents: bilateral aid and multilateral aid. When we analyze the effects of foreign aid with only Net ODA, 
the results are obviously ambiguous. Net ODA is only concerned with et official aid flows. However, foreign 
aid consists of not only official aid but also private flow. Multilateral aid may not include private flow 
because, by definition, it is aid given by international and regional organizations. However, bilateral aid 
includes not only official flows but also private grants or Capital Market flows. According to Mohamed’s 
paper, different types of foreign aid have different impacts on society and macroeconomics.26 The following 
is the empirical model concerning the impact of bilateral and multilateral aid on corruption, which helps us 
to get a more accurate conclusion: 
                                          
25 For a more precise data description and its source refer to the appendix.  
26 Masoud R. Mohamed and al. "Effect of Foreign Aid on Corruption: Evidence from Sub-Saharan 
African Countries." (International Journal of Social Economics vol. 42, no. 1, 2015), p.50 
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Corruptionit= β଴ ൅ Net bilateral aid ሺ% 𝑜𝑓 𝐺𝑁𝐼ሻitβଵ              
൅ Net Multilateral ODA ሺ% 𝑜𝑓 𝐺𝑁𝐼ሻitβଶ                                    
൅ 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥it 𝛽ଷ  ൅ 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒it βସ        … ሺ2ሻ                         
൅ 𝑅𝑢𝑙𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐿𝑎𝑤it βହ  ൅  𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝it β଺ ൅  u௜௧ 
 
Consistent with our main model, where i and t stand for each SSA country and time (from 2002 to 
2013),  β଴ is intercept, and uit is error term. Corruptionit is corruption index of country i in year t. Net 
bilateral aid is percentage of received bilateral aid as a share of GNI. Similar to bilateral aid, Net multilateral 
ODA is the percentage of received multilateral aid as a share of GNI. Other control variables are the same as 
the main model.  
Among several measurements of corruption, the most constantly used corruption index is the 
Corruption Perception Index (CPI) from Transparency International (TI). It measures the level of corruption 
in countries based on expert’s perceptions. This index is quantitatively calculated using data from 14 sources 
originating from 12 independent institutions. All sources measure the overall extent of corruption (frequency 
and/or size of bribes) in the public and political sectors and all sources provide a ranking of countries.27 The 
advantage of this measurement is a comprehensive set of primary resources, but the limitation of CPI is that 
it lacks a concrete measurement of corruption and it does not assess institutional framework or quality. The 
scale of CPI was from 0 to 10, where a low value means a more corrupt government and a high value means 
a less corrupt one. However, after 2010, the measurement and scale changed to 0 to 100, while the meaning 
of the values is the same. Because we cover the data from 2002 to 2013, for the data after 2010, the 
corruption level was rescaled to 0 to 10, thereby multiplying 0.1 by CPI.  
Compared with another corruption index, such as the Control of Corruption from Worldwide 
Governance Indicators, the original source of CPI captures the perception of the corruption of public officers 
                                          
27 Transparency International, Corruption Perception Index 2014: In detail, 
http://www.transparency.org/cpi2014/in_detail, (accessed October 2015) 
 14 
 
and politicians while Control of Corruption captures the level perception of corruption from public workers 
or bureaucrats concerning whether their government abuses public power for their grand or small private 
gains. 
Another main variable, foreign aid consists of many types and diverse methods of aid programs. For 
example, Official Development Assistance which defines the “flows of official financing administered and 
offered to 152 countries”28 is just one of the types of foreign aid from government to government, unlike 
private flow or private grants. According to World Bank data, there are several Net ODA indicators, such as 
Net ODA in current USD, and Net ODA per capita. In this paper, foreign aid is limited to ODA, more 
specifically, Net ODA (% of GNI) because this is the most accurate Net ODA of each country. The other two 
aforementioned variables can be an omitted because the amount of aid flow might be allocated depending on 
country size or high population rates. Multilateral aid and bilateral aid also stand for their aid flow as a ratio 
of GNI.   
In terms of the political factors of corruption, democracy is a key variable. According to Boone, the 
effect of aid on economic growth depends highly on regime status.29 In this paper, democracy index is 
covered by data from Freedom House, an American NGO. Data is available from 1972 onwards and is 
updated yearly. This variable is also in ascending order, so that the larger values indicate more democracy. 
The Democracy Index consists of a guarantee of political and civil rights in all countries worldwide. 
Therefore, we will use the average of both indicators and define it as Democracy Index.  
Government size is total government spending as a share of GDP. We expect that higher values lead 
governments to be more corrupt.  
GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided by midyear population.30 Data are in constant 
                                          
28 OECD, OECD Glossary of statistical terms, Official Development Assistance (ODA), 
http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=6043, (accessed October 2015) 
29 Peter Boone, "Politics and the Effectiveness of Foreign Aid.", (European Economic Review, 
vol.40, no.2, 1996) p.289-329 
30 World Bank, World Bank data description, 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.KD, (accessed October 2015) 
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2005 USD. As we did with general perception, we will apply the logarithm to GDP per capita.   
Lastly, Rule of Law, which is one of the Worldwide Governance Indicators, is the only law that has 
the authority to influence society. The scale of Rule of Law is also from -2.5 to 2.5, which means that a 
higher value means better governance. This indicator was also rescaled from 0 to 5 to remove the negative 
sign, which is the same methodology as with the control of corruption.   
 
3.2. Methodology 
In the previous analysis of the impact of aid on good governance or corruption research, mainly 
quantile regression and OLS regression with Generalized Method of Moment, or with Instrumental Variable 
were used.31 In a lot of the research, panel data is treated with two main types of methodology: random 
effects (RE) and fixed effects (FE).  
To use RE, specific individual characteristics which may affect the predictor variable are needed. 
One necessary assumption in Random Effect is that there is no correlation between an entity’s error term and 
predictor variables, which turns time-invariant variables into control variables. The side effect of Random-
Effect is the existence of unobservable variables which leads to omitted variable bias in the model. 
According to Oscar Torres-Reyna, professor at Princeton, Random Effects allows us to generalize the 
estimation beyond the sample used in the model.32 
A Fixed Effect model is usually used to estimate the impact of explanatory variables in time-
variance. It controls unobservable characteristics of each entity, which may have an impact on predictor and 
outcome variables. This model has two assumptions, one is that each variable’s own individual 
characteristics should be controlled, and the other is that time invariant characteristics should not be 
correlated with other characteristics. In other words, they are unique to the individual. The first assumption 
                                          
31 Okada and Samreth, 2012; Mohamed and al., 2015; Go Kotera and al., 2012 
32 Torres-Reyna Oscar, “Panel Data Analysis Fixed and Random Effects using Stata” (Princeton 
University, ver. 4.2, 2007 ), http://www.princeton.edu/~otorres/Panel101.pdf , (accessed October 2015) 
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is valid when the entity’s error term and the predictor variables are correlated. FE offsets the effect of 
aforementioned time invariant characteristics, so the net effect of the predictors on the outcome variable is 
estimated. In terms of the second assumption, because each entity has different characteristics, the 
correlation between an entity’s error term and the constant, which captures the individual characteristics, is 
strongly restricted. If they are correlated with each other, FE does not work as an estimator at all. However, 
there is a side effect of Fixed Effect. It cannot estimate time-invariant causes of dependent variables. 
According to Kohler, “Substantively, fixed-effects models are designed to study the causes of changes within 
an entity.”33 Therefore, a time-invariant characteristic cannot be the cause of change because it is constant 
for each entity . 
 To decide when to use fixed effect and random effect, the Hausman Test can provide the answer. 
The basic principal of this test is to prove whether there is correlation between the unique error term and the 
regressors. The null hypothesis of the Hausman Test is that there is no correlation between the unique error 
(Uit) and the regressor. If the null hypothesis is rejected, we use a fixed effect, unless, there is a random 
effect. With our panel data, P value is less than 0.05 in table 2, which means rejecting the null hypothesis. 
Therefore, it is rational to use FE in this model and for the panel data.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                          
33 Kohler et al. “Data analysis using Stata”, (Stata Press, 2nd edition, 2012), p.245 
Table 2. Hausman test result  
Test Summary Chi-sq.  Prob. 205.00 0.0000 
 (b) (B) (b-B) sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B)) 
 fixed random Difference S.E. 
     
Net ODA(%of GNI) -.005 -.004 -.001 . 
Democracy Index -.008 -.083 .074 .0289 
Government Size .003 .007 -.004 . 
Rule of Law -.075 .708 -.784 .102 
Log GDP per cap. 1.274 .273 1.002 .154 
b = consistent under H0 and H1 
B = inconsistent under H1, efficient under H0 
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To check the heteroskedasticity, we checked the robustness in the model by making a cluster 
standard error to deal with. 
However, there are multicolliniearity problems in the explanatory variable. Table 3 shows that the 
Variation Inflation Factor (VIF) is more than 10. Net ODA, bilateral and multilateral aid have an especially 
high VIF value. The reason is that foreign aid variables might be highly correlated to each other. However, in 
our model we used those variables separately. Therefore, multi-collinearity problems might be serious 
between bilateral and multilateral aid.  
Table 3. Multi-Collinearity between explanatory variables  
Variable VIF SQRT 
VIF 
Tolerance R- 
Squared 
Net ODA  
(% of GNI) 
190.98 13.82 0.005 0.995 
Bilateral aid 
(% of GNI) 
35.30 5.94 0.028 0.972 
Multilateral aid  
(% of GNI) 
83.69 9.15 0.012 0.988 
Democracy 2.61 1.62 0.383 0.617 
Government size 1.14 1.07 0.876 0.124 
Rule of Law 3.14 1.77 0.319 0.681 
Log GDP per 
capita. 
1.72 1.31 0.58 0.420 
Mean VIF 45.51    
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4. Empirical analysis  
 
In this chapter, empirical test results which apply the main model and sub model of the previous 
chapter will be presented. The results show how much foreign aid can effect government corruption. In 
addition, regression with a fixed effect of multilateral and bilateral aid illustrates which types of aid agents 
have a significant impact on government corruption.  
 
4.1 Total aid, democracy and corruption 
To examine the effect of aggregate aid on corruption, a fixed effect analysis was performed and the 
results are presented in Table 4 and Table 5. Based on the main model, by adding and subtracting variables, 
the results can allow us to analyze more accurately the effects of each variable on corruption. The difference 
between Table 4 and Table 5 is standardized coefficient. For Table 5, not only the dependent variable, CPI, 
but also the entire explanatory variable are standardized so that the mean is 0 and the standard deviation is 1. 
The purpose of this standardized regression coefficient is to illustrate the relative importance of the control 
variables and to compare the effect of the different changing variables. Therefore, it is interpreted differently 
compared to correlation coefficient.  
 In Table 4, Net ODA as a share of GNI has a significantly negative effect on the Corruption 
Perception Index in the entire column. Thus, it illustrates that any country which receives more ODA is more 
corrupt. To be specific, from column (1) to (4), correlation coefficient of Net ODA as a share of GNI is the 
same, while robust standard error is a little changed. Indeed, other explanatory variables: democracy, 
government size and rule of law, do not have significant effects on corruption. Thus, it can be interpreted that 
when a recipient country receives one percent more ODA as a share of GNI, the level of perception of 
government corruption is decreased by 0.008, which means a more corrupt government in Sub-Saharan 
African Countries. 
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Table 4. Net ODA(%of GNI) and corruption : Basic result(fixed effect) 
Dependent Variable : 
CPI (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) fixed effect fixed effect fixed effect fixed effect fixed effect 
Net ODA 
(% of GNI) 
-0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.005* 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
      
Democracy  -0.055 -0.028 -0.002 -0.008 
  (0.049) (0.058) (0.068) (0.055) 
      
Government size   0.006 0.006 0.003 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
      
Rule of Law    0.306 -0.075 
    (0.363) (0.297) 
      
Log GDP per capita     1.275*** 
    (0.326) 
      
Constant  3.040*** 3.270*** 3.063*** 2.394** -5.326* 
 (0.018) (0.206) (0.257) (0.804) (2.380) 
N 425 425 412 412 412 
R2 0.030 0.033 0.034 0.044 0.177 
Robust Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Dependent variable is Corruption Perception Index 
 
 
 
Table 5. Net ODA (%of GNI) and corruption : Basic result (Fixed effect with beta coefficient) 
Dependent Variable : 
CPI 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
fixed effect fixed effect fixed effect fixed effect fixed effect 
Net ODA 
(% of GNI) 
-0.116*** -0.118*** -0.110*** -0.106*** -0.066* 
(0.024) (0.024) (0.021) (0.019) (0.031) 
      
Democracy  -0.083 -0.042 -0.002 -0.013 
  (0.074) (0.088) (0.104) (0.083) 
      
Government size   0.051 0.050 0.024 
  (0.036) (0.035) (0.034) 
      
Rule of Law    0.185 -0.046 
    (0.220) (0.180) 
      
Log GDP per capita     1.472*** 
    (0.376) 
      
Constant  -0.005*** -0.010* 0.002 -0.004 -0.057** 
 (0.001) (0.005) (0.006) (0.010) (0.019) 
N 425 425 412 412 412 
R2 0.030 0.033 0.034 0.044 0.177 
Standardized Coefficient 
Robust Standard errors in parentheses  
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Dependent variable is Corruption Perception Index 
 
 
 20 
 
One interesting feature of this result is in column (5). When logarithm GDP per capita is involved in 
the control variables, the effects of Net ODA as a share of GNI is relatively decreased, while log GDP per 
capita has a significantly positive effect on reduction of government corruption. As we expected, when GDP 
per capita increases by one percent, Corruption Perception Index also increases. In other words, a country 
where GDP per capita is higher will have a less corrupt government.  
Moreover, in Table 5, we can interpret the importance of each variable. Compare with Table 4, the 
standardized coefficient decreases when other explanatory variables are involved. This is because of the 
multicollinearity between explanatory variables. However, the significance can be seen in the entire column 
(1) to (5), as with Table 4. Furthermore, Log GDP per capita has more effect on government corruption than 
Net ODA as a share of GNI. This feature is also distinguished in Table 4.   
 
4.2. Effects of Bilateral and Multilateral aid on corruption 
To prove more specifically the impact of ODA on government corruption, Table 6 and Table 7 show 
the results of the effect of bilateral aid and multilateral aid, which are the two main agent types of ODA, on 
corruption. The most important features is that the coefficients of bilateral and multilateral aid as a share of 
GNI, have a negative and significant effect on Corruption Perception Index, which means the more aid, the 
more corrupt a government is. In columns (1) and (2) of Table 6, where only bilateral aid or multilateral aid 
controls corruption, both control variables have 1% significance on the Corruption Perception Index. As we 
expected, the sign is negative, so the effects of bilateral and multilateral aid are to fuel government 
corruption in Sub-Saharan African Countries. In other words, when one of the Sub-Saharan African 
countries receives aid that is one percent more as a share of GNI from a donor country, Corruption 
Perception Index decreases as much as 0.011. In addition, when it receives foreign aid from an international 
organization or a mutual development bank, such as the World Bank, its government corruption level 
decreases as much as 0.015. Compared with bilateral aid, multilateral aid makes governments more corrupt. 
However, it does not mean that the effect of multilateral aid is more serious than bilateral aid. 
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Table 6. Bilateral Aid, Multilateral Aid, and corruption : basic result (Fixed Effect) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 fixed effect fixed effect fixed effect fixed effect fixed effect fixed effect est7 est8 fixed effect 
Bilateral aid 
(% of GNI) 
-0.011***  -0.008* -0.008* -0.007* -0.006* -0.005  -0.003 
(0.003)  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)  (0.002) 
          
Multilateral 
aid  
(% of NI) 
 -0.015*** -0.009** -0.009** -0.009* -0.010*  -0.009 -0.007 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)  (0.005) (0.004) 
          
Democracy 
Index 
   -0.054 -0.027 -0.001 -0.004 -0.007 -0.008 
   (0.050) (0.060) (0.069) (0.054) (0.055) (0.055) 
          
Government 
size 
    0.006 0.006 0.003 0.003 0.003 
    (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
         
Rule of Law      0.310 -0.084 -0.061 -0.069 
      (0.364) (0.296) (0.301) (0.299) 
          
Log GDP per 
capita 
      1.287*** 1.285*** 1.274*** 
      (0.327) (0.323) (0.327) 
          
_cons 3.033*** 3.022*** 3.048*** 3.272*** 3.070*** 2.393** -5.421* -5.432* -5.332* 
 (0.021) (0.013) (0.021) (0.210) (0.266) (0.798) (2.388) (2.358) (2.384) 
N 425 425 425 425 412 412 412 412 412 
R2 0.025 0.022 0.030 0.034 0.035 0.044 0.173 0.176 0.177 
Robust Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Dependent variable is Corruption Perception Index 
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Table 7. Bilateral Aid, Multilateral Aid, and corruption : Basic result (Fixed effect with beta coefficient) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 fixed effect fixed effect fixed effect fixed effect fixed effect fixed effect est8 est9 fixed effect 
Bilateral aid 
(% of GNI) 
-0.109***  -0.074* -0.074* -0.066* -0.057* -0.052  -0.025 
(0.030)  (0.033) (0.032) (0.027) (0.026) (0.034)  (0.024) 
          
Multilateral aid 
(% of NI) 
 -0.092*** -0.056** -0.058** -0.057* -0.061*  -0.056 -0.044 
 (0.018) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.023)  (0.031) (0.027) 
          
Democracy 
Index 
   -0.081 -0.041 -0.002 -0.006 -0.011 -0.012 
   (0.075) (0.090) (0.104) (0.082) (0.083) (0.083) 
          
Government 
size 
    0.050 0.049 0.025 0.023 0.023 
    (0.036) (0.035) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) 
         
Rule of Law      0.188 -0.051 -0.037 -0.041 
      (0.220) (0.179) (0.182) (0.181) 
          
Log GDP per 
capita 
      1.486*** 1.483*** 1.471*** 
      (0.377) (0.373) (0.377) 
          
_cons -0.006*** -0.003*** -0.006** -0.011* 0.002 -0.004 -0.057** -0.056** -0.057** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.005) (0.006) (0.011) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
N 425 425 425 425 412 412 412 412 412 
R2 0.025 0.022 0.030 0.034 0.035 0.044 0.173 0.176 0.177 
Standardized Coefficient 
Robust Standard errors in parentheses  
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Dependent variable is Corruption Perception Index 
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Even in the Table 6, column (3) where corruption is controlled only by bilateral and multilateral aid, when 
multilateral aid is changed by 1% as a ratio of GNI, the average change in the Corruption Perception Index is much 
bigger than with bilateral aid.  
With all explanatory variables, the most significant estimation is log GDP per capita. As with our main model, 
(Net ODA model), when log GDP per capita is involved in control variables, neither bilateral aid not multilateral aid 
have any significance while Net ODA has 10% significance in table 4, column(5).   
Through Table 7, we also can interpret how important each explanatory variable is and how much effect it 
has. One interesting feature in this table is that bilateral aid has more effect in intensifying government corruption than 
multilateral aid. Compared with Table 6, multilateral aid has relatively less effect on The Government Corruption 
Index, while change in government corruption is bigger than with bilateral aid. Furthermore, compared with table 5, 
column (5), when log GDP per capita is involved in the control variables, both bilateral and multilateral aid have no 
significant effect on the Corruption Perception Index. In other words, there is no evidence that increasing individual 
component of ODA (bilateral aid and multilateral aid) intensifies government corruption, while total net ODA has 
significantly negative effect on government corruption. However, when percentage of GDP per capita increases, it has 
a positive effect in reducing the perception of government corruption. 
 
5. Conclusion 
In this study, we use a fixed effect approach to reveal the impact of foreign aid on government corruption 
using the panel data of 40 Sub-Saharan African Countries from 2002 to 2013. Our results suggest that generally, 
foreign aid, especially ODA, fuels government corruption. Indeed with standardized coefficient, ODA has a significant 
negative effect on government corruption. Regarding bilateral and multilateral aid, with the results of the main model, 
both types of aid have a statistically significant negative effect on Corruption Perception Index. Therefore, both types 
of aid intensify government corruption. However, bilateral aid, in particular, has more effect on government corruption 
than multilateral aid, while multilateral aid leads to a larger change of government corruption.  
Out of main control variables included in the analysis of the main model, only log GDP per capita 
significantly reduced government corruption. However, when log GDP per capita is included, all other control 
variables are insignificant except for Net ODA. In other words, although total ODA has a significantly negative impact 
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on government corruption, it is not sufficient evidence to prove that foreign aid intensifies government corruption, due 
to the fact that bilateral and multilateral aid have no significance on government corruption within all of the control 
variables.   
Although the results show that foreign aid might accelerate government corruption, it does not mean that 
donor countries should stop providing aid to recipient countries. From these investigations, it is possible to suggest 
some policy implications to improve aid effectiveness on the reduction of government corruption in the region of SSA.  
First, the monitoring and evaluation systems of foreign aid need to be enhanced. From a donor’s point of 
view, an aid allocation criterion is directly related to aid effectiveness. To increase aid effectiveness, donors may 
carefully evaluate their aid projects. Developing monitoring and evaluating aid projects is an ongoing process. 
However, even OECD/DAC countries do not implement their own monitoring and evaluation criteria, nor do 
dependent institutions which can be responsible for a development project. Fortunately, in recent years, “Impact 
Evaluation” methodology was developed by international organizations: the World Bank, Asian Development Bank, 
OECD etc. According to OECD, the definition of impact evaluation is “an assessment of how the intervention being 
evaluated affects outcomes, whether these effects are intended or unintended. The proper analysis of impact requires a 
counterfactual analysis of what those outcomes would have been in the absence of the intervention.”34 
The purpose of this impact evaluation is to provide an analysis of the causes of the outcomes and failures by 
estimating the impact of aid projects. It already has a well-developed toolkit and quantitative methodology. The key 
feature of this evaluation is a Randomized Trail. Two groups were divided: the control group and the treatment group 
by random selection, then the difference between the two groups were analyzed after implementing an aid project. Of 
course there are some disadvantages. For example, it only focuses on observable variables, ignoring an evaluation of 
unobservable variables, such as social capital. Moreover, as a limitation of an estimable variable, a project by mutual 
partnership or by theory of change cannot be evaluated. However, this evaluation definitely allows us to do an 
objective evaluation in the development corruption field.    
Second, both donor and recipient countries develop diverse and effective foreign aid projects. After the Paris 
declaration in 2005, aid effectiveness arose as a key issue. In order to provide foreign aid more effectively, diverse 
development cooperation was developed. One good example is South-South Cooperation (SSC). Actually SSC existed 
in the 1960’s however, it developed further after 2000. The definition of SSC is a “broad framework for collaboration 
                                          
34 OECD, Evaluation of development programmes-Outline of principles of Impact Evaluation, 
http://www.oecd.org/dac/evaluation/dcdndep/37671602.pdf, (accessed October 2015) 
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among countries of the South in the political, economic, social, cultural, environmental and technical domains.”35 
The basic elements of SSC are organizing and managing development projects by developing countries themselves. 
Most aid projects provide from North to South. Thus, donor countries cannot fully understand the social and economic 
situations of recipient countries. However, in SSC, most recipient countries have geographical proximity, thereby 
increasing cultural similarity with each other. Therefore, developing countries can understand which social and 
economic factors are needed in the least developed countries. Indeed, SSC is a horizontal relationship and it uses the 
experience and capacity that already exists in the development of new capacities in developing countries.36 Therefore, 
these aid programs are relatively more effective than North-South Cooperation. Related to this issue, Triangle 
Cooperation has recently been developed. In brief, it is North-South-South Cooperation, so that developed countries 
provide some expert or technical assistance, and the other southern countries manage the development project. As 
governments of recipient countries are actively involved in their development project, foreign aid cannot be abused, 
and government corruption can be reduced.  
Lastly, a Knowledge Sharing Project needs to be developed. This is also a new program in the international 
cooperation field. Providing infrastructure or technical assistance is just one aspect of an aid project. Indeed, some 
recipient countries may have fancy infrastructure, but due to lack of knowledge, many of them do not use this 
infrastructure. Indeed, the rule of knowledge is emphasized in the development process. Therefore, voluntary 
incorporation of knowledge sharing in development cooperation efforts becomes important as a way of enhancing 
developmental effectiveness. In Korea, Knowledge Sharing Program (KSP) was implemented in 2004. In the same 
vein, some international organizations carry out similar development programs: ‘Knowledge Bank’ and ‘Solution 
Bank’ from the World Bank; ‘Knowledge Broker of the region through Knowledge Management’ from the Asian 
Development Bank; ‘Knowledge Based Economy’ and ‘Knowledge Sharing Alliance’ from OECD. In brief, Korean 
KSP is designed to assist development partnership countries in key policy areas by sharing Korea’s development 
knowledge and experience.37 The target of this program is public officers and governments of partner countries. 
Through this program they can learn how sound institutions and good policy are important to develop. KSP can 
improve the quality of governance as it implements good policy. Through the KSP program, Korea has already 
                                          
35 United Nations Office for South-South Cooperation(UNOSSC), What Is South-South Cooperation?, 
http://ssc.undp.org/content/ssc/about/what_is_ssc.html, (accessed October 2015) 
36 United Nations Office for South-South Cooperation(UNOSSC), What Is South-South Cooperation?, 
http://ssc.undp.org/content/ssc/about/what_is_ssc.html, (accessed October 2015) 
37 Knowledge Sharing Program, KSP is, http://www.ksp.go.kr/ksp/ksp.jsp (accessed October 2015) 
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provided more than 580 policy consultations for cumulatively 140 countries up to 2013. Of course, some issues remain. 
The duration of the program is no longer than 3 years (most are a year). Therefore, this policy consultation program 
should link with follow-up practical development projects which can lead towards making visible development 
outcomes.  
The role of the government is absolutely important in performing social and economic development in 
developing countries. However, when it is corrupt, the efforts of donors and even recipients are wasted. To break out 
of this vicious cycle, donor countries need to provide transparent aid and respect the recipient countries’ situations. It 
is equally important that both the recipient government and its public are aware of the economic and social situations 
of their nations to increase the effectiveness of the aid. One of the most important notions here is that in order to 
eliminate the impediments to African development, maintaining ineffective foreign aid is certainly not a better route at 
all. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
 
 
A. Data Description and its sources    
 
Variables Description Sources 
 
Corruption Perception Index 
 
TI defines corruption as the abuse of 
entrusted power for private gain, including 
corrupt practices in both the public and 
private sectors. It is Corruption Perceptions 
Index (CPI) ranks countries according to the 
perception of corruption in the public sector. 
It is rescaled from 0 to 10 so that a smaller 
value indicates more corruption. 
 
Transparency  
International 
Bilateral Aid (% of GNI) The Net disbursements of official 
development assistance (ODA) from the 
members of the Development Assistance 
Committee as a share of GNI 
World Bank Data 
Multilateral Aid (% of GNI) ODA from international organizations such as 
the World Bank and regional development 
banks divided by GNI.  
OECD/DAC Statistics 
Democracy Index The Freedom House provides two indices of 
political rights and civil liberties. Democracy 
is defined as the average of these two 
variables. This variable is rescaled so that a 
larger value indicates a greater level of 
democracy. 
Freedom House 
Government size General government final consumption 
expenditures as a share of GDP. 
World Bank Data 
Rule of Law Capturing perceptions of the extent to which 
agents have confidence in and abide by the 
rules of society, and in particular the quality 
of contract enforcement, property rights, the 
police, and the courts, as well as the 
likelihood of crime and violence. 
Worldwide Governance 
Indicators 
Log GDP per capita Represents the change in per capital income 
of the people with Logarithm. It is measured 
as the country’s level of per capita GDP at 
time t 
World Bank Data 
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APPENDIX B 
 
 
 
B. Summary Statistics 
 
Variable Observation Mean Standard Deviation. Min Max 
Corruption Perception Index 425 2.956 1.027 1.1 6.5 
Net ODA(% of GNI) 480 10.933 14.523 -.25 181.19 
Bilateral Aid (% of GNI) 480 7.486 10.092 -.308 129.455
Multilateral Aid (% of NGI) 480 4.727 6.507 -.038 80.549 
Democracy Index 480 4.245 1.553 1 7 
Government Size 467 15.347 8.234 2.047 86.906 
Rule of Law 480 1.807 .6219 .645 3.557 
Log GDP per capita 480 6.589 1.185 4.904 9.645 
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C. Correlation Matrix 
  
 Corruption 
Perception 
Index 
Net ODA 
(% of GNI) 
Bilateral Aid 
(% of GNI) 
Multilateral Aid 
(% of NGI) 
Democracy 
Index 
Government 
Size 
Rule of 
Law 
Log GDP 
per capita 
Corruption 
Perception Index 
1.000         
Net ODA 
(% of GNI) 
-0.142 
(0.003) 
1.000        
      
Bilateral Aid  
(% of GNI) 
-0.150 
(0.002) 
0.966 
(0.000) 
1.000      
     
Multilateral Aid  
(% of NGI) 
-0.1289 
(0.008) 
0.916 
(0.000) 
0.792 
(0.000) 
1.000     
    
Democracy Index -0.668 
(0.000) 
0.028 
(0.546) 
0.011 
(0.814) 
0.040 
(0.381) 
1.000     
   
Government Size 0.351 
(0.000) 
0.017 
(0.708) 
0.039 
(0.405) 
0.001 
(0.990) 
-0.264 
(0.000) 
1.000    
  
Rule of Law 0.833 
(0.000) 
-0.155 
(0.001) 
-0.111 
(0.015) 
-0.183 
(0.000) 
-0.775 
(0.000) 
0.334 
(0.000) 
1.000   
 
Log GDP per capita 0.498 
(0.000) 
-0.477 
(0.000) 
-0.485 
(0.000) 
-0.459 
(0.000) 
-0.245 
(0.000) 
0.162 
(0.000) 
0.424  
(0.000) 
1.000 
Significance level in parentheses 
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Figure 1. Net ODA (% of GNI) and Corruption Perception Index  
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Figure 2. Bilateral Aid (% of GNI) and Corruption Perception Index  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Multilateral Aid (% of GNI) and Corruption Perception Index  
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